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Book Reviewed
Destined for War: Can
America and China Escape
Thucydides’s Trap?
By Graham Allison

P

rofessor Graham Allison gazes into the future of US-China
relations in Destined for War: Can America and China Escape
Thucydides’s Trap? only to find the best guide to the future is the
past. Specifically based on Thucydides’s well-known observation that “It
was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made
war inevitable,” Allison has popularized the phrase “Thucydides’s Trap”
to describe the dangerous historical dynamic that develops when a rising
power threatens to displace an established ruling power.1 This dynamic
was summarized aptly in an earlier article: “The rise of a new power has
been attended by uncertainty and anxieties. Often, though not always,
violent conflict has followed. The rise in the economic and military
power of China, the world’s most populous country, will be a central
question for Asia and for American foreign policy at the beginning of a
new century. ”2
In researching cases of rising powers challenging ruling powers over
the last 500 years, Allison and the Thucydides Trap Project at Harvard
University found 12 of 16 cases resulted in war. Avoiding Thucydides’s
Trap thus equates to avoiding war. Based on this analysis, Allison
concludes that “as far ahead as the eye can see, the defining question
about global order is whether China and the United States can escape
Thucydides’s Trap.”3
The high percentage of cases that resulted in war provide persuasive
support to the overall argument that war between the United States and
China may be more likely than generally considered. Yet a few cautionary
notes on the data set and methodology are warranted.
First, while the principal result of the study (12 of 16 cases led to
war) seems objective, decisions on what cases to include necessarily
involve some subjective analysis. As such, the overall data supporting
the general argument have evolved since the initial Thucydides’s Trap
argument was presented. In 2012–14 the argument cited 11 of 15 cases
leading to war.4
1      For more on Professor Allison’s paraphrase of Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert
B. Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press, 1996), bk. 1, ch. 23, line 6, see Destined
for War, n. 2, 297.
2      Joseph S. Nye Jr., “As China Rises, Must Others Bow?,” Economist, June 25, 1999.
3      Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?,”
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), xvii.
4      In a 2012 op-ed in the Financial Times, and subsequently in the New York Times, Professor
Allison supported the general argument by noting that “In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 where a rising
power emerged to challenge a ruling power, war occurred. ” Graham Allison, “Thucydides’s Trap
Has Been Sprung in the Pacific,” Financial Times, August 21, 2012; and Graham T. Allison, “Obama
and Xi Must Think Broadly to Avoid a Classic Trap,” New York Times, June 6, 2013.
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In 2015 and subsequently, the data set
was revised to include 12 of 16 cases that
resulted in war.5 Later in 2015, a detailed
argument presenting the Thucydides’s
Trap metaphor appeared in the Atlantic.
The 16 cases were identified in a table
accompanying the article and included
information on time period, ruling power,
rising power, and result. 6
In Destined for War the data also
include 12 of 16 cases leading to war, but a
comparison between the table in the book
(42) and the table from the 2015 Atlantic
article shows one case from the 2015 data
was dropped and another was added. In the
Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can
event, they both resulted in “no war” so the
America and China Escape Thucydides’s
overall numbers remain the same; but, such
Trap? (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2017), 384 pages, $28.00
changes highlight the difficulties inherent
to determining which cases to include.
While 12 of 16 may have a scientific ring, the result may be less rigorous
than it appears; certainly, it is subject to further analysis.7
Notwithstanding such questions about the aggregate data, the
book’s use of the Thucydides’s Trap metaphor to alert the potential,
indeed the seeming likelihood, that the current global shift in power
could lead to war is its principal strength. The book’s conclusion, based
on the available evidence, “when a rising power threatens to displace a
ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the
rule, not the exception,” is a powerful warning that should help focus
the attention of both policymakers and scholars to the perils inherent in
the uneven growth of power.8
Although a valuable lens through which to see the current shifting
relationship between the United States and China, the text is somewhat
less useful in prescribing policy or strategy responses that might be taken
in pursuit of US objectives given the international context described.
As an aid to statecraft, Allison says, “History shows that major ruling
powers can manage relations with rivals, even those that threaten to
overtake them, without triggering war. The record of those successes,
as well as the failures, offers many lessons for statesmen today.”9 The
challenge for strategists and policymakers, however, is to distinguish the
5      In Professor Allison’s 2015 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the
data set was updated to include 12 of 16 cases which led to war. See Hearing on China, the US, and
the Asia-Pacific, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong (April 14, 2015) (statement, Dr.
Graham T. Allison, Director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and
the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard’s Kennedy School).
6      Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?,” Atlantic,
September 24, 2015.
7      For example, a list on the Thucydides’s Trap Project website of potential additional cases that
may be included in a second phase of the analysis includes 14 cases of which 7 led to war and 7 did
not. While none have yet been included in the overall data, the variance in the result highlights the
importance of decisions of which cases to include and which not to include. See “Can America and
China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?,” Belfer Center, Harvard Kenndey School, accessed July 18, 2017,
http://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/methodology/thucydides-trap-potential
-additional-cases.
8      Allison, Destined for War, xv.
9      Ibid., xvii.
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historical lessons to avoid war, which vary widely and are in some cases
mixed if not contradictory. Here former Presidential Historian Arthur
Schlesinger’s lament “that the past is an enormous grab bag with a prize
for everybody” would seem applicable.10
To illustrate how differing conclusions might be drawn, we might
compare two cases from the Thucydides’s Trap analysis which had the
same result of “no war.” In case number 11 regarding the British response
to rising American power in the early twentieth century, Allison observes
that Great Britain chose a strategy of ad hoc accommodation, deciding
“to make a virtue of necessity and to yield to the Americans in every
dispute with as much good grace as was permitted.”11In case number 15, a
rising Soviet Union challenged the United States for several decades, but
the end result was “no war.”12 In what Allison describes as the “greatest
leap of strategic imagination in the history of America diplomacy,” a
“comprehensive strategy for a form of combat never previously seen”
was developed to conduct a cold war “by every means short of bombs
and bullets.”13 The result, though not war, was that “the US and Soviet
Union made systemic, sustained assaults against each other along every
azimuth except one: direct military attacks.”14
For the statesman or strategist intent to avoid Thucydides’s Trap
the above two examples offer starkly different historically-derived
approaches: accommodation or cold war. The advice to “apply history”
found in chapter 10, “Where Do We Go from Here?,” while sensible,
still begs questions on which history and how it is to be applied.
A fundamental challenge arises for efforts to apply the Thucydides’s
Trap methodology and data to strategy and policymaking. The study
designates war as the dependent variable. Could dependent variables
other than war be understood in the context of Thucydides’s Trap? In
other words, could strategic objectives beyond avoiding war be addressed
by the information and evidence presented in the study? Allison cites
Clausewitz’s famous line: “War is an extension of international politics
by other means.”15
In case 9, the rise of Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, the
“war” result suggests France and Germany fell into Thucydides’s Trap.
Yet, the Franco-Prussian War assisted in the attainment of Bismarck’s
main strategic objective of unifying the German states around a strong
Prussia. Is it possible that war could be a rational choice in pursuit of
national objectives? The answer, according to the analysis in Destined
for War, is no. Of the “Twelve Clues for Peace” offered in chapter 9,
several point out, given the unprecedented nature of nuclear weapons,
war between modern great powers is “madness” and “no longer a
10      Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., “ ‘Lessons’ of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in
American Foreign Policy. By Ernest R. May,” Journal of American History 61, no. 2 (September 1974):
443–44; doi:10.2307/1903961, cited in Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien
Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 8.
11      Allison, Destined for War, 42; and Ernest R. May and Zhou Hong, “A Power Transition and Its
Effects,” in Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the U.S.-China Relationship, ed. Richard Rosecrance
and Gu Guoliang (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 13, cited in Allison, Destined for War, 197.
12      Allison, Destined for War, 42.
13      Allison, Destined for War, 202–203.
14      Ibid., 203.
15      Ibid.
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justifiable option.”16 Without doubt, this is an exceedingly sensible
position. Yet, must we then discount historical analogies drawn from
events in the prenuclear age?
To resolve the conundrums of the Thucydides’s Trap metaphor
posed in the preceding two paragraphs, a couple of suggestions are
offered. First, using a variety of different dependent variables to review
the historical cases of a rising power challenging a ruling power could
yield important knowledge. By identifying a nation’s strategic priority
as the dependent variable, for example, insight could be collected into
whether either power achieved its objectives. A possible observation
would be that in x of y cases the rising power achieved its objectives,
or alternatively, the ruling power achieved its objectives. How they did
so would be the subject for further inquiry. Several variations on this
approach might be useful.
A second approach might be to disaggregate the data and conduct
detailed analyses of each case compared to the present using the
structured methodology articulated by Richard Neustadt and Ernest
May in their book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers
and cited favorably in Destined for War.17By shifting the focus from the
aggregate to the specific; identifying known, unknown, and presumed
facts; and detailing both similarities and differences between the cases,
the historical record would reveal a more comprehensive and nuanced
picture that could provide important insights. Indeed, Allison previously
used this approach to good effect, and it would complement the more
general description of the cases included in Destined for War.18
Yaacov Vertzberger reflected “history does not contain an inherent
truth which necessarily reveals itself to the scholar or practitioner. It
maintains many faces when studied with great care and through the
application of scientific methodology.”19 Seen in that light, Destined
for War presents not inherent truth, but one face, an important face,
revealing a dangerous historical dynamic reflected more prominently in
description rather than prescription.

16      Ibid., 206–209.
17      Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for DecisionMakers (New York: Free Press, 1986), 232–46, cited in Allison, Destined for War, n. 5, 337.
18      Graham Allison, “Just How Likely Is Another War? Assessing the Similarities and Differences
between 1914 and 2014,” Atlantic, July 30, 2014.
19      Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, “Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-Intuitive Historians:
Applied History and Its Shortcomings,” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (June 1986), 244.

